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Abstract 
 
This article considers why price-based frameworks may be inherently unsuitable for 
delivering unprecedented global emissions reductions while retaining the necessary 
public and political support, and argues that it is time to instead draw on quantity-
based mechanisms such as TEQs (Tradable Energy Quotas). 
 
TEQs is a climate policy framework combining a hard cap on emissions with the use 
of market mechanisms to distribute quotas beneath that cap.    
 
The significant international research into TEQs is summarised, including a 2008 UK 
government feasibility study, which concluded that the scheme was “ahead of its 
time”.  TEQs would cover all sectors within a national economy, including 
households, and findings suggest it could act as a catalyst for the socio-technical 
transitions required to maximise wellbeing under a tightening cap, while generating 
national common purpose towards innovative energy demand reductions. 
 
Finally, there are reflections on the role that the carbon management community can 
play in further developing TEQs and reducing the rift between what climate science 
calls for and what politics is delivering.  
 
 
 
 
Executive Summary 
 
Framing 
 Politics is not reflecting the urgency of climatology findings. 
 Interdisciplinary analysis shows that carbon pricing is an unsuitable policy 
framework to guide the unprecedented emissions trajectory required. 
 
Carbon pricing cannot deliver four essential features of an effective climate 
policy framework: 
 Ensuring real and radical emissions reductions in practice. 
 Facilitating public/political acceptability for the implementation of such cuts. 
 Embedding a longer-term perspective into societal decision-making. 
 Integrating cross-sector engagement with intrinsic motivation and society wide 
co-operation. 
 
An alternative policy framework: TEQs (Tradable Energy Quotas) 
 TEQs is similar to a national electronic rationing scheme for energy, but with 
legally tradable allowances.  It could meet the four criteria outlined above. 
 It combines downstream engagement with upstream enforcement and would 
cover all sectors of a national economy, including households. 
 It would act as an umbrella framework, ensuring a hard cap on emissions and 
supporting other climate policy. 
 Research into the scheme suggests that it may be expected to meet with 
greater public acceptability than carbon pricing frameworks, as it is a 
progressive scheme that would safeguard entitlements to energy while leaving 
households to manage their consumption as they see fit. 
 TEQs draws on principles from social psychology in engaging a nation's 
ingenuity in reducing energy demand.  It attempts to define new norms of 
acceptable carbon consumption and create a clear shared goal, generating 
common purpose around intrinsic shared desires to overcome climate change 
and retain secure access to essential energy services. 
 
A political history of TEQs 
 
 TEQs was first developed in 1996.   
 A UK government feasibility study in 2008 declared it “ahead of its time” on 
grounds of cost and public acceptability, and so the government withdrew 
from funding further research at that time, although expressing continued 
interest.
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 Substantial research since, including 2011’s high profile cross-party 
parliamentary report, has challenged these negative conclusions.  
 
Conclusion 
 
 As members of the carbon management community, we must frankly 
recognise the shortcomings of carbon pricing frameworks. 
 Hard cap based schemes are called for, and TEQs is the best-placed to 
reconcile the rift between science and politics. 
 Governments must be challenged on their failure to implement their own 
carbon targets, and why they do not implement frameworks suited to do so. 
 The carbon management community has a key role to play in refining, 
promoting and driving the implementation of TEQs in a national context. 
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Reconciling scientific reality with realpolitik: moving 
beyond carbon pricing to TEQs – an integrated, economy-
wide emissions cap 
 
PERSPECTIVE 
 
 
The essential problem is easily stated: there is a rift in realism.  Realism about the 
findings of climate science demands dramatic and immediate emissions reductions if 
we are to avoid catastrophic destabilisation of the global climate [1,2].  Anderson and 
Bows argue that these reductions must be in the region of 10% per annum in 
industrialised (UNFCCC Annex 1) countries [3,201].  Yet present political reality in 
these countries says that such reductions are unthinkable [4].  While realists about 
climatology rightly argue that physical reality 'bats last' and does not negotiate, 
realists within politics argue with equal validity that any approach that tries to 
radically transform society against society's wishes will be resented and, soon enough, 
rejected. 
 
The failure to reconcile these viewpoints is perhaps the greatest obstacle facing the 
field of carbon management, since without clear agreement about where society is 
transitioning to, it becomes virtually impossible to effectively enable the socio-
technical changes required, and to retain the necessary public backing.  If we are 
seeking only to tweak the economy for marginal, politically palatable emissions 
reductions, then carbon pricing might be an appropriate framework.  For example, it 
can serve to stimulate the incremental adoption of 'low hanging fruit' such as overdue 
efficiency improvements [5].  However, climatologists are ever clearer that we require 
dramatic and unprecedented emissions reductions in order to avoid the worst ravages 
of climate destabilisation [6]. 
 
(terms in orange are explained in ‘Key Terms’ on p.25) 
 
As Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change lead author Josep G. Canadell 
recently stated in this journal, “The time has come to truly build carbon management 
into the deepest inner workings of society” [7].  Canadell goes on to state the common 
assumption that “no doubt” this should be achieved through carbon pricing.  His 
recognition of the need for a coherent, overarching framework to harness the many 
facets of climate policy and action towards the goal of dramatic global emissions 
reductions is entirely justified.  However, in this article we raise significant doubts 
that carbon pricing is the most appropriate candidate to deliver the speed and depth of 
change required, regardless of whether prices are set via carbon trading (e.g. the 
European Union Emissions Trading Scheme) or carbon taxation.  The dominance of 
the argument that price-based mechanisms are best able to deliver change in an 
efficient and cost-effective way [8,9] may be concealing other options from view, but 
alternatives are both available and much needed. 
 
As is widely recognised in the field of socio-technical transition, in order to achieve 
deep societal change, the path-dependency and political and cultural lock-in which 
underpins current carbon usage must be addressed.  This requires careful 
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consideration of the multiple levels where change can be directed, and where pressure 
can be brought to bear [10], in order to nurture individual and organisational agency 
and develop alternative practices [11,12].  Smith et al. and others within the field note 
that marginal approaches that “treat regime transformation as monolithic and 
dominated by rational action” [11] may have been appropriate for addressing problems 
such as acid rain or water pollution, but are unlikely to succeed when applied to more 
challenging problems like climate change and resource depletion, which require a 
range of fundamental, complex and interrelated system changes [11,13].  A fresh 
approach is therefore needed. 
 
As such, we, the carbon management community, have contributed to the widening 
rift between science and politics by attempting to respond to the imperatives of 
climatology with policy interventions that do not reflect the workings of society.  As 
the literature on socio-technical transitions shows, a reconciliation will require action 
from us all: scientists, policy makers, campaigners and the public [11,12,13,14].  Within 
academia, we can begin by improving our cross-disciplinary communication, in 
particular by aligning the recommendations from climate science more closely with 
findings in the fields of socio-technical transitions, social psychology and climate 
policy, and vice versa.  One of the aims of this Perspectives article is to contribute to 
this process. 
 
We begin by arguing for certain necessary features that any successful carbon 
management framework needs to display if it is to enable the scale and depth of 
changes required, both technically and socially. We consider several ways in which 
current policy frameworks fail to meet these, and then go on to assess an alternative 
with significant political and research history – TEQs (Tradable Energy Quotas) – and 
whether it demonstrates the required features.  Finally, we draw conclusions about 
appropriate pathways for future climate policy. 
 
 
 
Essential features of an effective climate policy framework  
(and why carbon pricing is failing to deliver) 
 
 
Ensuring emissions reductions 
 
The fundamental shortcoming of the existing climate policy approach is its failure to 
curb emissions, with global CO2 emissions from burning fossil fuels reaching a record 
high of 36 billion tonnes in 2013 (61% above 1990 levels, 2.1% above 2012) [15].  In 
the words of the International Energy Agency, addressing this requires “a far-reaching 
transformation of the global energy system” [16]. 
 
There are two approaches to achieving such radical change in a short timeframe; the 
essential difference between them being which of two variables is adjusted.  Climate 
policy frameworks either act to influence energy prices (e.g. carbon taxation) in the 
belief that consequent emissions reductions will be sufficient to avoid climate 
catastrophe, or to place a cap on emissions (e.g. TEQs, explained below) in the belief 
that the price effects of this will not cause economic catastrophe.  These are termed 
the price-based and quantity-based approaches, respectively. 
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The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) is the largest emissions 
trading scheme in operation and perhaps the most prominent existing climate policy 
framework [17].  It caps emissions from the EU’s power sector and heavy industry, and 
is notionally a quantity-based 'cap and trade' scheme.  However, in practice it has a 
ceiling on permit prices and is linked to non-EU nations through the Clean 
Development Mechanism and Joint Implementation framework, meaning that it has 
what is termed a 'soft cap' – i.e. no absolute limit on emissions, as demonstrated by 
the hundreds of millions of tonnes of carbon that have been emitted above the level of 
its 'cap' [18].  Neither the ‘global carbon market’ established through the Kyoto 
Protocol and subsequent international negotiations [19], nor a raft of national and 
regional carbon markets [20], have delivered emissions cuts of the speed and scale 
required. 
 
Since they lack a hard cap, such frameworks are, in effect, price-based schemes, 
wherein an appropriate carbon price becomes necessary to achieving the intended 
emissions reductions (note that for the purposes of this article we do not distinguish 
between price-based schemes and hybrid schemes, since both open up the possibility 
of exceeding the cap, and it is the integrity of the cap that is our primary concern here) 
[21,22].  As such, they reduce the financial risk of high prices causing economic 
catastrophe at the expense of foregoing the benefits of quantity-based schemes that 
are explored below.  It is perhaps unfortunate that the term ‘cap and trade’ is widely 
applied to such effectively price-based schemes, as it can cause confusion and leaves 
us lacking a widely-understood distinct term for ‘hard cap and trade’ schemes.  In this 
article, we refer to such alternative frameworks as ‘quantity-based’ or ‘hard cap’ 
schemes. 
 
As both theory and present experience demonstrate [1,3,5,15,23], price-based mechanisms 
cannot deliver certainty of adequate emissions reductions.  This is in part because 
energy demand has proven to be resilient (inelastic) in the face of price rises [24,25], but 
also because there will always be significant uncertainty as to whether the price is set 
at the right level to reflect the social cost of carbon.  Arriving at a definite figure is 
rendered impossible by the need to incorporate unknowable factors, such as the exact 
economic impacts of present day emissions on future generations (including non-
marginal catastrophic scenarios) and forecasts of future atmospheric greenhouse gas 
concentrations [9,26,27].  As Rosen and Guenther argue,  
 
“humanity would be wise to mitigate climate change as quickly as possible without 
being constrained by existing economic systems and institutions, or risk making the 
world uninhabitable … since we can never know what the cost of a hypothetical 
reference case would be, and since we must proceed with a robust mitigation 
scenario, we will never be able to determine the net economic benefits of 
mitigating climate change, even in hindsight” (emphasis in original) [28]. 
 
Consequently, given what is at stake, we argue that a quantity-based ‘hard cap’ is the 
appropriate framework for our present situation, since this can guarantee achievement 
of a long-term emissions trajectory defined by climate science, as long as the 
framework itself has the public/political support to survive the subsequent economic 
effects.   
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We note that the rate of transition committed to by the UK government under its 
Climate Change Act (a 31% reduction in emissions from 2013 to 2025, representing a 
50% reduction on 1990 levels) has already led to tension and a real threat to the 
political sustainability of the Act itself [4,202,203], despite that current policies cannot 
deliver on such a carbon budget without “significant design improvements and 
increased ambition, extended further in time” [29]. 
 
It must also be remembered that the Climate Change Committee which recommended 
those commitments – tasked with representing physical reality in negotiation with the 
political reality of the day – stated at the time that “the level of ambition in this 
[carbon] budget should be regarded as an absolute minimum, and more may be both 
feasible and required” [30].   
 
Meeting more ambitious targets, however, such as Anderson and Bows’ annual 10% 
reductions, could be devastating for those in fuel poverty and politically damaging for 
those associated with such ambition, unless an appropriate policy framework can be 
found and implemented [3,204].  This is where the clash of physical reality (as revealed 
by climate science) and political reality becomes most apparent.  Thus far we have 
collectively ignored the rift between the two, telling ourselves that the problem is 
being addressed as emissions continue to rise.  Moving to a quantity-based framework 
would call our bluff and prompt the necessary reconciliation; a painful one, no doubt, 
yet kinder than unmitigated climate change is liable to demand. 
 
And as well as choosing an appropriate framework, we must also apply it widely and 
consistently.  At present, even in countries that lead the way on carbon management, 
almost half of emissions – those generated by individuals and households – are not 
currently covered by any overarching, consistent policy framework.  The UK, for 
example, has relatively ambitious, legally-binding emissions targets [31] and 100+ 
present or planned policies that impact on the level of household carbon emissions: 
from taxation, tax rebates, feed-in tariffs and grants to building regulations, 
information schemes, smart meters and appliance labelling [32].  However, these are 
collectively labouring under what Kern et al. characterise as UK energy policy’s 
“complex and incoherent” governance framework [33], with the House of Commons 
Environmental Audit Committee concluding that “existing initiatives are unlikely to 
bring about behavioural change on the scale required, with many individuals choosing 
to disregard the connection between their own emissions and the larger challenge” [34].  
Consequently, the potentially huge collective impact of individual and household 
decisions on energy-use is not being fully realised, and will be essential to a 
successful climate mitigation effort. [35,36]. 
 
Price-based frameworks could potentially be applied to this [37], but we will now 
consider certain inherent features of carbon pricing frameworks that have contributed 
to their becoming sufficiently unpopular that even climate activist groups oppose and 
demonstrate against them [205].  In this context, any attempt to directly engage 
households in a pricing framework is perceived as a risky political move, and may 
even be perceived by some stakeholders as 'letting government off the hook' by 
shifting away the responsibility for action [38]. 
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Public acceptability 
 
If a compulsory climate policy framework is to be applied to individuals, families and 
their homes, it is likely to receive far more scrutiny than present upstream 
approaches.  In this context, the carbon pricing approach of treating all equal-sized 
emissions cuts as fungible can be expected to raise controversy.  While it is true that 
the geographical location of cuts make little difference to the climatic impact, other 
differentiating features become highly significant when radical restructuring of the 
economy is necessary.  For example, society may distinguish between what Shue 
broadly terms “subsistence emissions” – here, the emissions perceived as unavoidable 
when living within a household's current societal context – and “luxury emissions”, 
that could reasonably be cut back [5,39].   
 
These distinctions are culturally subjective and transitory – as society changes, the 
emissions required for 'subsistence' will change, as may the modes of subsistence – 
but while emissions perceived as 'luxury' may be called on for adaptation, any 
programme that cuts back on perceived 'subsistence emissions' is likely to experience 
a significant public backlash.  Consequently, winning and retaining popular and 
political support requires carbon management frameworks that deliver emissions 
reductions while safeguarding entitlements to basic energy services [40]. 
 
Another reason underlying the unpopularity of the carbon pricing approach is that it 
embeds a contradiction at the heart of policy.  The UK Department of Energy & 
Climate Change (Decc) describes its aims as being to “make sure the UK has secure, 
clean, affordable energy supplies and promote international action to mitigate climate 
change” [206].  Yet if decarbonisation is pursued primarily by striving to raise carbon 
prices, then it pulls against affordability of energy supply.  Over 80% of global energy 
still comes from fossil fuels [207], so aiming to raise carbon prices while keeping 
energy affordable is difficult – the prices of energy and carbon remain stubbornly 
linked.  Accordingly, price-based approaches as currently designed tend to hurt the 
poorest, both globally and within nations, as the deliberate raising of the price of 
carbon makes energy unaffordable for many, effectively rationing energy by price.   
 
To put this in context, household energy bills in the UK have increased by 75% over 
the past ten years (as compared with 23% general price inflation, and despite a 
reduction in energy consumption).  Although the Committee on Climate Change find 
that four-fifths of this increase is unrelated to climate policy, the public have 
nonetheless come to identify the current suite of climate change mitigation policies 
with further increases to already-rising energy prices [41].  In these straitened times, 
this drains public and political support, especially when juxtaposed with the widely-
reported windfall profits reaped by corporate participants in the EU ETS [42].   
 
Simpler, more radical price-based proposals like the ‘Fee & Dividend’ revenue-
neutral carbon tax [208] could, if implemented, mitigate the impact on the poorest and 
thus bolster the political sustainability of the policy, potentially making a higher 
carbon fee/tax feasible.  However, such frameworks would still preserve the double 
agenda – the need for both higher carbon prices and lower energy prices – that leaves 
the ‘rift in realism’ unresolved, and underpins the incoherence of our present policy 
suite. 
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As discussed in detail below, quantity-based frameworks offer the powerful 
possibility of a simple, shared, high-profile focus throughout society: keeping the 
price of energy as low as possible. 
 
 
A longer-term perspective 
 
In addition to failing to recognise the distinction between 'subsistence' and 'luxury' 
emissions, carbon pricing also struggles to account for another way in which 
emissions cuts of the same size may differ.  Consider a one-tonne CO2 cut resulting 
from a new renewable energy technology, or from a different way of organising social 
life.  This type of cut may unlock the possibility of dramatic future cuts.  By contrast, 
consider a different one-tonne cut resulting from an end-of-pipe technology added to 
inherently carbon-intensive infrastructure which must soon be closed down.  Viewed 
from a long-term perspective, the impacts of these one-tonne cuts differ significantly 
[5].   
 
For a sustainable transformation in societal emissions we need policy that places such 
sensitivity to wider transformational potential at the core of decision-making.  
Decisions and investments which may take twenty years or more to achieve the 
intended results are required throughout society, and appropriate long-term planning 
will only happen under a widely-supported policy framework combining clarity and 
longevity.   
 
Price-based frameworks have tried to fulfil this overarching role, but since they 
inherently treat all emissions reductions as fungible, allow for uncertainty with regard 
to the expected overall rate of decarbonisation, and cannot provide a consistent long-
term signal to the economy (a stable price will be inappropriate at certain points of the 
economic cycle, while a fluctuating price lacks the necessary consistency [17,40]), they 
instead often drive short-term, quick-fix approaches.  These in turn can reinforce 
political and cultural lock-in, resulting in higher emissions over the longer-term [23].    
 
A truly effective framework would need to provide real clarity and confidence 
regarding the long-term trajectory towards a low-carbon future, allowing society to 
focus on innovating towards that end, rather than on meeting the immediate 
requirements of patchwork policy [10,11].  
 
 
Integration – cross-sector engagement, motivation and collaboration 
 
Bringing individuals, households, business and all energy-users into climate policy in 
an engaged and integrated way would open up significant new possibilities for cross-
sector co-operation.  The “complex and incoherent” governance framework [33] under 
which climate policy currently operates may have obscured the possibilities here, but 
they are potentially huge. 
 
As Peters, Fudge and Hoffman recently highlighted in this journal, there is both a 
need and a failure “to engage people individually and collectively in establishing 
more sustainable, low-carbon societies” [43], with the provision of a clear vision 
recognised as critical to such large-scale system change [11].   
 
10 
 
If a clear and effective method could be found to stimulate common purpose in 
carbon reductions throughout society, articulating the direction of travel visibly at a 
range of levels, then the practical and political challenges of achieving dramatic 
emissions cuts could quickly take on a very different appearance.  From our current 
perspective, it may seem unlikely, even utopian, to imagine communities and 
households collaborating with each other to this end, alongside companies and local 
and national government.  However, this is precisely the kind of radical change that 
climate policy must catalyse in order to enable citizens to maximise their wellbeing 
within adequate carbon constraints [40,44]. 
 
 
Having outlined some of the features of present practice that are contributing to the 
current rift between science and policy, we will now describe and consider an 
alternative framework that engages with these shortcomings, and thus may offer an 
effective way forward. 
 
 
A candidate policy framework: TEQs (Tradable Energy Quotas) 
 
The TEQs scheme is a quantity-based framework for emissions that integrates all 
sectors of the economy, including households.  It would operate at the national scale 
[45], providing a means for a country to guarantee the achievement of its national 
carbon budget, and thus play its part in – even lead – the global climate change 
mitigation effort [40]. 
 
Several excellent expositions of the detail of the scheme now exist [40,46,47], but in 
essence it can be thought of as similar to an electronic system for rationing energy 
use, only with legal trading of allowances.  A variant named Personal Carbon 
Allowances (PCAs), which would cover only household emissions, has also been 
proposed [48], with Personal Carbon Trading (PCT) having become the established 
umbrella term for these related schemes. 
 
PCT as a whole has been described as “an innovative, radical policy approach to 
climate mitigation” [35], with TEQs in particular described as “a simpler and fairer 
approach than either green taxation or the European Union Emissions Trading 
Scheme, [that] also provides people with a powerful incentive to demand low-carbon 
technologies” [49]. 
 
Under TEQs, every adult would receive an equal free entitlement of TEQs units each 
week.  All other energy users – government, industry, etc. – would secure their TEQs 
units through a weekly tender (auction), either by directly participating, or via 
intermediaries such as high street banks or the post office (known in the literature as 
‘market makers’ or ‘primary dealers’) [47]. 
 
The total number of TEQs units issued into the economy would be determined by the 
national carbon budget (in the UK this is currently recommended to the Government 
by the Committee on Climate Change).  The proportion of that total issued as free 
entitlements would reflect the proportion of national emissions produced by the direct 
fuel and electricity use of the household sector (currently around 40%), with the 
remainder issued to organisations via the weekly tender [50]. 
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Whenever fuel or energy was purchased in the country, a number of units 
corresponding to the amount of energy bought would have to be surrendered to the 
retailer from the purchaser's TEQs account, in addition to their monetary payment.  
This number would be determined by the carbon rating carried by all fuels and 
electricity, which is calculated on the basis of the lifecycle emissions associated with 
their production and use (and thus provides a competitive advantage to low-carbon 
energy sources) [40,47].   
 
TEQs units would only be required for direct purchases of fuel and energy (not for 
purchases of all products and services within the economy) and unit transactions 
would generally be automatic, integrated into existing credit-card and direct-debit 
systems [51].   
 
Those households using less than their entitlement of TEQs units would be able to sell 
their surplus to the bank or post office at the prevailing national price (determined by 
the auction price at the start of the week and varying with national demand thereafter).  
Those who need more could buy these surplus units at the national price, with the 
process of buying and selling comparable with topping up a mobile phone or travel 
smart-card (e.g. London's Oyster cards).  Similarly, overseas visitors, or others 
without units, would simply pay a surcharge at the point of energy purchase, 
determined by the retailer buying the necessary units on their behalf and passing on 
the cost. 
 
 
Figure 1: How TEQs units flow through the economy [40] 
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A full year’s supply of TEQs units would be issued via both entitlement and tender on 
the first day of the scheme.  From then on, the regular weekly issue of new units 
would commence.  Hence there would be a rolling year's supply of units in the 
economy at all times. 
 
As illustrated in Figure 1, after TEQs units pass from consumers to energy retailers at 
the point of energy purchase, those same units would then pass from the retailers to 
wholesalers as the retailers purchased their own energy supplies.  They would 
continue to flow up the energy supply chain until ultimately reaching the country's 
primary energy providers and importers.  Finally, these organisations would surrender 
the units back to the original issuing body (registrar) in exchange for the right to 
produce or import energy into the economy, in line with the national carbon budget.  
In other words, at every point where energy moves through the economy, the units are 
exchanged for the energy and thus flow in the opposite direction.   
 
Crucially, this allows downstream public engagement without the need for an 
extensive downstream compliance and enforcement process.  Just as with cash, any 
supplier who sold fuel or energy without ensuring the receipt of the requisite number 
of TEQs units would quickly find themselves out of pocket when purchasing their 
own supplies.  And, just as with cash, the government does not need to monitor every 
retailer to ensure that they are not giving away their stock.  Nothing more than routine 
auditing would be called for [22,52]. 
 
TEQs also seeks to combine the best of upstream and downstream policy by covering 
all emissions from energy use within the economy, while requiring neither direct 
measurements of emissions at the point of combustion nor a lifecycle analysis of 
every possible product and service.  Through the lifecycle carbon rating on fuels and 
electricity, the emissions attributable to them can be quantified upstream.  And since 
energy is required for all economic activity, the emissions implicit in the production 
of all goods and services are thus covered.  For example, no TEQs units are 
surrendered for the purchase of a chair, but the manufacturer of the chair will have 
needed to purchase units, as will the company who transported it to the shop, and they 
will pass the costs on to their customers (in the cash price that they charge).  So, 
downstream, consumers simply find that the cheaper option tends to be the lower-
carbon option, while retailers who are able to offer a lower-carbon supply chain 
receive a clear competitive advantage. 
 
With regard to goods imported from abroad (and on the assumption that there is not a 
TEQs system or equivalent operating in the origin country), import tariffs will likely 
be necessary to protect domestic producers.  Until recently, such tariffs were deemed 
politically unrealistic, but the World Trade Organisation have now admitted that their 
rules do not prohibit such tariffs [209], and there is growing political recognition that in 
the absence of a robust global agreement on climate change, tariffs are the only option 
to defend countries that take their emissions responsibilities seriously [53,210] 
 
Importantly, just as with carbon pricing, TEQs is not intended as a stand-alone policy, 
but rather as “the umbrella mechanism within which a wide range of other policies 
would operate” [46].  Indeed, it has the potential to create a far more receptive national 
environment for the many vital carbon management tools covered in this journal and 
elsewhere, from green taxation and sweeping standards-based regulation [204] to the 
creation of low-carbon precincts [54] and atmospheric carbon removal technologies 
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such as agroecological soil carbon sequestration [55] or industrial direct air capture [56].  
The key is that by ensuring the overall carbon budget is respected, TEQs provides the 
overarching framework to shift such policies from worthwhile (yet sometimes 
resented) drops in the ocean to essential and much-welcomed initiatives helping 
society to thrive as it moves through a difficult energy transition. 
 
We will examine the political climate around TEQs presently, but first let us consider 
the ways in which it may outperform price-based mechanisms with regard to the 
criteria outlined above. 
 
 
Ensuring emissions reductions 
 
As discussed above, quantity-based systems such as TEQs can guarantee achievement 
of the national carbon budget over its full term in a way that carbon pricing cannot, as 
long as the TEQs framework itself remains in place. 
 
It should be noted that despite the current dominance of price-based and ‘soft cap’ 
approaches, the core debate between price-based and quantity-based approaches goes 
back at least a century, with quantity-based approaches finding favour when the 
stakes were at their highest and quantities least negotiable.  As historian Mark 
Roodhouse summarises, 
 
“the use of taxes alone to control consumption was rejected in the World Wars, 
and they would not achieve the quick, dramatic cut in carbon consumption that we 
need now to avert environmental disaster. Tradable carbon rations would have a 
real impact, if the public could be persuaded that they are necessary, temporary 
and fair” [57; see also 58]. 
 
And it is in that last caveat that we find the real challenge for any effective climate 
policy framework – persuading society as a whole that the framework should be 
retained as it enables the tightening carbon budget to affect industry, lifestyle choices 
and the economy as a whole.   
 
This is where the literature on socio-technical transitions can make an essential 
contribution.  It emphasises that since society and its practices are made up of 
“institutions, techniques and artefacts”, as well as “rules, practices and networks that 
determine the ‘normal’ development and use of technologies” [11], we need to alter not 
only our policy tools and structures, but also “markets, user practices, policy and 
cultural meanings” [10]. 
 
As we will examine, TEQs engages fully with these imperatives.  The real question 
for the carbon management community, therefore, is not simply which frameworks 
could theoretically enable effective and sufficient carbon reductions, but whether the 
evidence from all relevant fields suggests that TEQs may stand a better chance than 
the alternatives of doing so without being overthrown by public or political 
opprobrium. 
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Public acceptability 
 
We have seen above that carbon pricing frameworks have been struggling with 
popularity, and this partly explains why public acceptability has been the most active 
area of research into PCT schemes. 
 
Fawcett's review of the research to date [36,46,59] shows that the findings are remarkably 
consistent.  When PCT schemes are compared with existing climate policies they are 
usually preferred by the public, with the key benefits seen as fairness and 
effectiveness.  This popularity relative to the alternatives immediately makes PCT an 
interesting proposition, especially considering that “the research highlighted that the 
way that personal carbon trading is presented and described and the context in which 
it is set, can have a considerable impact on its acceptability” [60].  Accordingly, even 
more positive results might be expected from acceptability research which put 
significant effort into framing and communicating the TEQs scheme's design and 
principles.  Interestingly, the research to date also identified that respondents who 
were not in favour were primarily concerned about implementation and unfairness, 
which serves to underline the importance of perceived fairness in achieving social 
acceptance [46].   
 
TEQs addresses such concerns over fairness in three main ways.  Firstly, the system is 
based on the principle of equal per capita allowances for all, with the guaranteed 
regular entitlement of TEQs units for every individual designed to ensure that 
essential 'subsistence emissions' are safeguarded as society adapts to a low or no 
carbon future, irrespective of the price trends of TEQs units [39].  As mentioned above, 
what constitutes 'subsistence' or 'luxury' is highly culturally subjective and subject to 
change over longer periods, but TEQs incorporates these shifting perspectives by 
leaving these choices with the energy consumer.   
 
If a citizen wishes to consume more than her share she may do so – and without 
compromising the integrity of the emissions cap – but only if she is willing to, in 
effect, pay those who use less for the privilege of doing so.  And if others choose to be 
exceptionally energy-thrifty, they can expect to be rewarded for this.  This freedom 
for individuals, families and communities to decide for themselves what is essential 
and what is not is critical both politically and practically. Sharing ownership of the 
problem across society encourages both active, engaged participation in creatively 
reducing energy demand, and a sense of legitimacy around the TEQs framework, 
which can be seen guaranteeing entitlements to essential energy while defending 
people's independence from excessive top-down regulation and/or taxation [40,61]. 
 
Secondly, TEQs is a progressive policy instrument, since lower income households 
tend to use less energy and thus could sell surplus allowances to gain extra income.  
Distributional impact modelling has found that 71% of households in the lowest three 
income deciles would be better off under TEQs, while 55% of households in the 
highest three income deciles would be worse off.  From a total of 24.6m UK 
households, 2.1m (8.5%) would be low-income households that would be worse off 
[62,63].  However, this is an important minority, primarily because they may not be in 
any position to be further disadvantaged, but also because any opposition to the 
scheme after implementation would be likely to focus on those in difficulty.  
Consequently, further research has been undertaken into moderating the distributional 
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impacts on these households, finding that all but 250,000 of the poorest 10% of 
households could be compensated through the benefits system [64].  Finding ways to 
identify these remaining 250,000 households and target them with compensatory 
measures remains an area of active research [65].   
 
And thirdly, TEQs provides an alternative to the unpopular 'rationing by price' 
approach currently in effect.  While TEQs incorporates a market mechanism to do 
what markets do best – finding a price for scarce goods and facilitating exchange – it 
is not a market-based framework.  Rather, it is a framework within which the market 
would be constrained, in line with the national carbon budget; the ongoing financial 
crises of recent times show all too clearly that markets are not good at regulating their 
own appetites.  It is not what they are for. 
 
At the heart of TEQs is a non-negotiable respect for the limits set by physical reality, 
as revealed by climate science.  This gives society as a whole a clear signal as to 
future emissions limits, stimulating a collective focus on adapting to these limits.  In 
particular, government need no longer concern itself with attempting to raise the 
carbon price, but can straightforwardly join and support [66] the collective drive to 
keep the price of energy as low as possible.  This is a simply-understood task that all 
sectors of society can enthusiastically engage with.   
 
 
A longer-term perspective 
 
An independent body responsible for setting national carbon budgets (or 'cumulative 
emissions pathways' [67]) decades in advance, was anticipated by the TEQs literature 
[68] and is now extant in the UK in the form of the Committee on Climate Change.  
However, the Committee currently lacks a means to see its budgets effectively 
implemented. 
 
This undermines the benefits of its long-term carbon budgeting, as investors across 
society recognise both the uncertainty that the budgets will be achieved and 
government inconstancy in defending the budgets themselves.  TEQs would provide a 
clear, consistent policy framework to guarantee the budgets, while its acceptability 
benefits (and the public engagement anticipated in the next section) would offer the 
greatest possible confidence that the framework will persist over the long-term. 
 
The system would also aid confident long-term financial budgeting across the 
economy by helping to stabilise national energy prices in the face of global 
fluctuations.  If global energy prices rose, this would be reflected in reduced national 
demand for energy and thus for TEQs units.  As a consequence, the TEQs unit price 
would drop as global energy prices rose, and vice versa, leaving the effective price 
paid by energy users (energy price + TEQs price) more stable than the price of either 
energy or TEQs units alone. 
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Integration – cross-sector engagement, motivation and collaboration  
 
TEQs’ design draws on principles from social psychology.  It is explicitly designed to 
generate a shared sense of common purpose (or, in behavioural economics terms, 
“conditional co-operation”[69]) in a nation, in recognition of both the vital role of 
public engagement in any large-scale transition [11], and the fact that social forces are 
an important and enduring influence on individual choices [70,71].   
 
All sectors buy and sell TEQs units at a single national price, and since supply of the 
units is fixed by the hard cap, the fluctuations in this price are determined solely by 
national demand for (carbon-rated) energy.  Hence, it is in all sectors' interest to keep 
this price low, not only by reducing their own energy use (or its carbon intensity), but 
also by collaborating with others in doing so, and bringing pressure to bear on those 
who are perceived to not be 'pulling their weight'.  In this way, it aligns individual and 
collective interests in order to harness the creativity and innovation of a nation 
towards the clearly-visible aim of lower energy prices [40,47], providing “a perceptual 
and cognitive framework enabling individuals to integrate understanding across 
emissions from different activities, and in the context of energy use as it occurs” [35].   
 
In addition, a number of studies suggest that the clear demarcation of a 'normal' or 
even 'appropriate' level of carbon consumption (in the form of the declining 
entitlement) may be expected to reduce energy demand accordingly, with the high 
visibility of the national price of TEQs units also generating positive mental 
accounting effects and generating 'stop and think moments' that disrupt high-carbon 
habits [66,72,73].  The public's understanding of their own energy use and emissions will 
inevitably improve, with the national TEQs price – published daily in the press and 
online [47] – providing a clear indicator of how successfully, or otherwise, the country 
is adapting to its carbon cap.  Research suggests that as such understanding grows and 
people gain a sense that they are contributing to an adequate solution, they may 
become increasingly committed (even morally) to 'doing their bit' to play a role in an 
overall solution, and thus more supportive of ambitious climate policy [74,75].  
 
Also, as Smith and colleagues note, “even in transition contexts where end-points are 
highly contested or only partially understood, ideas about what might (or ought to) be 
are essential to envisioning the possibility, let alone motivating the pursuit, of change” 
[11].  A positive, enticing image of where we are headed is essential, and with the UK 
government itself bound by the TEQs framework, it would be far better placed for the 
task of articulating a coherent vision [76] for the low-carbon society that its Climate 
Change Act commits the country to.   
 
Above all, while academics and policy-makers can try to predict some of the societal 
effects of a transparent and accessible carbon framework, under TEQs the need to do 
so is removed.  No longer would government be responsible for micro-managing the 
transition itself.  Instead, once the common frame is set, many of the changes within 
that framework can be allowed to emerge organically, in the diverse – even ‘messy’ – 
way that new collaborations and local innovations tend to develop [40,77].  Such 
‘bottom up’ initiative and ownership is also likely to encourage wider engagement 
with, and buy-in to, the overall societal transition [78].   
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However, while acknowledging that, “from this distance, it is hard to describe its 
nature in any detail”, Fleming has nonetheless speculated as to some of the forms 
such cross-sector co-operation might take, from communities and companies co-
operating in sourcing local goods and services to households working together on 
conservation, renewable energy systems, repairs and local food [40].  Where 
supplementary institutional support is needed, it will be called for by those involved – 
those individuals, communities or institutions with intimate knowledge of the 
practical detail – rather than government or NGOs trying to develop and provide 
resources and/or expertise on the basis of what they anticipate may be needed [11,61].  
Meanwhile, the revenue from the auction of TEQs units provides funds that can be 
pulled down by those involved in such projects [40] (see supplementary discussion 
below – p.24 – for more on auction revenue allocation). 
 
Some such collaborations do already exist, with the Transition Towns movement and 
its REconomy strand, for example, providing a myriad of practical examples of such 
cross-sector co-operation towards reduction in energy demand and carbon emissions 
[79,211].  Crucially, however, under current policy frameworks such efforts are always 
swimming against the tide.  For example, a hard-won reduction in petrol use in one 
city might serve to bring down the price a little, thus encouraging greater consumption 
elsewhere and leading to little or no net reduction in emissions.  Understanding this 
can be disheartening for those trying to contribute towards large-scale problems like 
climate change, which helps explain why those involved with such local climate 
initiatives have consistently been among the strongest campaigners for TEQs [80,81]. 
 
With its hard cap on emissions in place, TEQs would reverse this effect.  Any local 
reductions in energy use would not only save money for those involved, but also play 
a clear, practical part in aiding the energy transition of the nation as a whole, with the 
contribution to lower energy prices for all becoming a straightforwardly desirable 
outcome which helps to defend the political sustainability of the TEQs framework and 
its hard cap.  The implementation of TEQs would provide clear reassurance that we 
really are ‘all in it together' at the national scale, greatly diminishing established 
psychological barriers to energy demand reduction such as concerns about free riders 
and the sense that your personal contribution cannot make a difference [47,82]. 
 
TEQs is also here drawing on the distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic 
motivation.  By defining a clearly understood and intrinsically desirable goal 
(sustaining affordable access to energy, and by so doing ensuring that the nation plays 
its part in preserving a benign climate), TEQs aims to make shared intrinsic 
motivation explicit across society.   
 
Note that even those individuals with below-average energy use who regularly have 
surplus to sell from their TEQs entitlement – who might be thought to gain financially 
from high TEQs unit prices – would not stand to benefit from rises in national 
(carbon-rated) energy demand.  Such rises would cause the price of both TEQs units 
and energy to increase, so in addition to a direct rise in the price of their energy 
purchases (offset to some extent by increased income from the sale of their TEQs 
entitlement) our energy-thrifty individual would encounter a general increase in the 
prices of products and services throughout the economy, caused by higher energy 
prices.  Even in the unlikely scenario that such an individual mistakenly believed that 
TEQs unit price rises were in their personal short-term financial interest and decided 
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to attempt to drive them up by somehow blocking demand reduction, they could come 
under intense peer pressure to desist.  In a society consciously working hard to adapt 
to the energy transition those seen as responsible for raising energy prices might be 
treated even less warmly than they are today.  The tide would have turned. 
 
This focus on the importance of intrinsic motivation again draws on social psychology 
research, which shows not only that external financial incentives and disincentives 
generally fail to produce improved performance at tasks requiring long-term 
behaviour change, insight or creativity, but that they can actually have a detrimental 
effect.  This is because they can undermine both people's belief in their own abilities 
and any pre-existing intrinsic motivation towards the goal [83,84,85], while acting to 
reinforce materialistic values and frames (that have been found to suppress systemic 
concern for society or the shared environment) [84].  Accordingly, policy based purely 
on financial rewards and/or penalties may be unsuited to stimulating radical socio-
technical transitions from the grassroots up; such policy runs the risk of 
unintentionally engaging society’s ingenuity in the wrong challenge – that of seeking 
out clever ways to receive the rewards or avoid the penalties without heed to the 
policy's intended aim – instead of that of reducing collective energy demand.   
 
In short, as the UK Environmental Audit Committee's report into PCT summarised,  
 
“We remain to be convinced that price signals alone would encourage significant 
behavioural change comparable with that resulting from a carbon allowance … A 
meaningful reduction in emissions will only be achieved, and maintained, with 
significant and urgent behavioural change.” [34]. 
 
Having examined the arguments as to why TEQs may represent a more appropriate 
carbon management framework than carbon pricing, we now outline TEQs' political 
and research history, and consider why it has not yet moved closer to implementation.  
 
 
 
A political history of TEQs  
 
 
The TEQs framework was developed in 1996 [40,86,87].  In 2004 eleven UK Members 
of Parliament (MPs), led by Colin Challen (who would later found the All Party 
Parliamentary Group on Climate Change), introduced a Private Members' Bill 
advocating the scheme [88].  This led to extensive international research and popular 
interest, although much of this was published in the form of books and reports rather 
than in academic journals [49,80,81,89,90,91,92]. 
 
In 2006 the then Secretary of State for Environment, David Miliband, gave a strong 
speech in support of PCT, shortly followed by the announcement of a feasibility 
study, which was completed in 2008 [93,94].   The authors of the four reports that make 
up this study were instructed to take the TEQs scheme as their subject, since this was 
deemed to provide the best insight into the merits or otherwise of PCT as a model [95].  
The study found that there were no technical obstacles to implementation, that PCT 
would be a progressive policy and that public acceptability was comparable with, or 
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slightly better than, the presented alternatives of upstream trading and carbon taxation 
(these conclusions were in line with the existing wider research into PCT).   
 
However, the most influential report within the study assessed the “potential 
effectiveness and strategic fit” of PCT [96].  Unlike the other reports, this explicitly 
considered a PCA scheme (i.e. PCT applied only to individuals), thus removing 
several of the key benefits that TEQs claims, such as providing a framework for 
intrinsic motivation, innovation and common purpose.  It also argued that 
“uncertainty about how high the price of allowances may go poses a political risk that 
makes it unlikely that a hard cap would be used” and argued instead for a more 
flexible 'soft cap', whereby the cap is loosened if prices go too high.  In other words, 
before conducting its analysis it converted PCAs into a price-based framework.  On 
this basis, its analysis concluded that the costs of PCT would outweigh the benefits, 
leading to Defra's overall conclusion that “personal carbon trading has potential to 
engage individuals in taking action to combat climate change, but is essentially ahead 
of its time and expected costs for implementation are high.”  
 
Accordingly, Defra announced that 
 
“the Government remains interested in the concept of personal carbon trading 
and, although it will not be continuing its research programme at this stage, it will 
monitor the wealth of research focusing on this area and may introduce personal 
carbon trading if the value of carbon savings and cost implications change”[95]. 
 
A number of thoughtful and critical responses to the government's decision to 
discontinue its research programme followed, including from The Lean Economy 
Connection [22], the Centre for Sustainable Energy [212] and the Institute for Public 
Policy Research [97].  Significantly, the influential House of Commons Environmental 
Audit Committee (EAC) published its own report just a few weeks after Defra's, 
based on its own concurrent collection of evidence.  This described PCT as “the kind 
of radical measure needed to bring about behavioural change”, “regretted” Defra's 
decision to discontinue its research programme and concluded that PCT  
 
“could be essential in helping to reduce our national carbon footprint…Although 
we commend the Government for its intention to maintain engagement in academic 
work on the topic, we urge it to undertake a stronger role, leading and shaping 
debate and coordinating research.” [34]. 
 
However, the UK government's response to this report largely restated the findings of 
Defra's feasibility study and did not express any change of viewpoint in response to 
the EAC's evidence and support, reiterating the opinion that high costs and fears over 
public acceptability outweighed the potential of the proposition [98].  There were press 
claims that the idea had been banned by Gordon Brown at the Treasury [213]. 
 
This slowed the momentum behind the scheme, although in June 2009 a ministerial 
debate was called by Tim Yeo MP, then chair of the EAC, who opened with the 
statement: 
 
“Whatever we are doing now by way of generating low-carbon electricity, 
constructing more energy-efficient buildings, developing low-emission vehicles 
and so on, it is nowhere near enough…Every single citizen as a consumer needs to 
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be directly engaged in the battle against climate change. That is why personal 
carbon trading deserves far more attention than it is getting, either from the 
Government or from other people” [99]. 
 
He went on to call for a pilot scheme, volunteering the Barbergh District Council area 
in his own constituency of South Suffolk for the role [99].  There is significant debate 
within the research community as to whether PCT is suited to a pilot (which would be 
likely to have its effectiveness undermined by significant boundary issues, as well as 
limited duration and participation [90,100,101]), and this opportunity was not pursued, but 
interest in the idea remained, with academic research continuing to accelerate [59].  
After the 2010 UK general election Tim Yeo became Chair of the House of Commons 
Energy and Climate Change Select Committee, and has remained a keen advocate of 
PCT [102,214]. 
 
High-profile public support over the next couple of years included the Sustainable 
Development Commission highlighting PCT as one of nineteen breakthrough ideas 
for the 21st century [103], and the chairman of the Environment Agency declaring that 
“rationing is the fairest and most effective way of meeting Britain’s legally binding 
targets for cutting greenhouse gas emissions” [215]. 
 
The government's commitment to monitor future PCT research, and to reconsider 
implementation if higher benefits or lower costs could be demonstrated, prompted the 
All Party Parliamentary Group on Peak Oil to publish a report into TEQs in 2011.  
This made a strong case that the government's criteria for again considering the 
introduction of TEQs had been met, and that a fresh and thorough feasibility 
evaluation was now called for [40]. 
 
Drawing on the research published since 2008, the report argued that Defra's cost-
benefit analysis had taken its cost estimate from an analysis of a whole-economy 
TEQs scheme [51] while comparing this with the benefits of a more limited 
households-only PCA scheme [96]; that the likely costs of a TEQs scheme would be far 
lower [22,97] ; that Defra's purely financial analysis failed to give regard to several 
additional benefits of TEQs, including ensuring fair entitlements to energy during 
reductions in supply (whether due to rapid decarbonisation or insecure energy supply 
chains) [40], shifting perceived norms in acceptable behaviour [66], contributing to a 
national sense of common purpose and the importance of the hard cap in providing 
both effectiveness and an improved long-term signal [22]; and that the methodology 
adopted in the cost-benefit analysis was subject to such large uncertainties over 
critical variables that even with all of these shortcomings the conclusion could still 
easily have been positive [104]. 
 
The association with a cross-party parliamentary group and a report launch featuring 
presentations from high-profile MPs helped the report to achieve extensive media 
coverage, both nationally and internationally [216].  However, it garnered no official 
response from Decc, who later confirmed that despite the government's commitment 
to monitor ongoing research, the department had no staff allocated to take 
responsibility for this area [105]. 
 
As a consequence, without a public groundswell of support to drive political 
engagement with such radical climate policy, TEQs' development (and that of PCT 
generally) has slowed.  Nonetheless, it remains core policy for the Green Party of 
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England and Wales [217], while Sweden’s Green Party [218] and Left Party [219] have 
both passed resolutions in support of a feasibility study.  Dario Tamburrano, Member 
of the European Parliament for Italy’s Five Star Movement, is another significant, 
long-standing advocate within European politics [220], while wider interest is sustained 
by academia [36,59,221], NGOs [106,107,222], independent campaigners [223,224], community 
groups [101] and a PCT-related trial on Norfolk Island, a self-governing protectorate of 
1,750 people 1,600 km east of Australia [108,225].  
 
As the EAC concluded in 2008,  
 
“what is needed, urgently, is a shift in the debate away from ever-deeper and more 
detailed consideration of how personal carbon trading could operate towards the 
more decisive questions of how it could be made publicly and politically 
acceptable” [34]. 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
As Maslow noted, “...it is tempting, if the only tool you have is a hammer, to treat 
everything as if it were a nail”[109].  The carbon management community must frankly 
recognise the inherent shortcomings of our hammer – carbon pricing – as a 
framework for a task as delicate and demanding as the socio-technical transitions 
needed to rapidly limit emissions.  This article has laid out a number of these 
shortcomings and outlined several principles that we believe are essential if any 
framework is to stimulate an effective, sufficient reduction in emissions. 
 
Given the stakes, we argue that the climate policy community should favour quantity-
based frameworks that can guarantee the emissions trajectory that science demands.  
With such a firm framework established, economists, designers, engineers, policy 
specialists, society and the market could unleash their full focus on devising brilliant 
means for maximising wellbeing within that context.  And we have evidenced the 
case that the TEQs framework stands the best chance of retaining the requisite public 
support and engagement over the long-term. 
 
Returning to political realities, the implementation of such an unyielding framework 
will only happen if the political risk of failing to prevent the destabilisation of our 
climate comes to be seen as outweighing the risk of high prices.  This would 
undoubtedly represent a fundamental shift in the direction of both politics and carbon 
policy.  Yet, if we do not change direction, we are likely to end up where we are 
headed. 
 
The UK government's description of TEQs as 'ahead of its time' in 2008 implied that 
it was too radical and too different from the prevailing public and political thinking.  
However, Fawcett highlights that this charge could also be laid against that 
government's own Climate Change Act pledge of 50% carbon reductions by 2025 [46].  
In relation to current emissions trends the government's target must itself be 
recognised as radical, and any reasonable definition of 'politically realistic' must 
include holding governments to existing legally-binding policy.  Any government 
with such commitments cannot shy away from the policy framework that can actually 
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enable the deep socio-technical changes needed to deliver these targets (as well as 
laying the groundwork for the yet greater ambition many scientists deem necessary 
[110]). 
 
For our part, the carbon management community must take responsibility for 
reminding governments of this, in every way open to us, in order to address our own 
complicity in perpetuating the science/politics rift described above.  It behoves us all 
to consistently remind ourselves and others of the severity of the likely climatic 
consequences should such a framework be abandoned (or never adopted).  If political 
and scientific reality are not reconciled, only one will pull rank.  Allowing this would 
be perhaps the greatest abrogation of responsibility ever seen. 
 
 
Future Perspective 
 
 
The coming years are the 'last chance saloon' for climate policy.  Continued failure to 
address atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases is likely to mean committing 
our planet to climate destabilisation [1,2,3,6], while consigning the field of carbon 
management to failed obsolescence.  As Kevin Anderson put it at the December 2013 
Radical Emissions Reduction conference, “avoiding dangerous climate change 
remains a feasible goal of the international community.  Just.” [111]  Significant 
changes to energy supply infrastructure are not possible on such a short timescale, so 
dramatic energy demand reductions of the kind that TEQs was designed to facilitate 
are now the only option, allowing time for low-carbon energy supply to come on 
stream [40, 204]. 
 
Bird and Lockwood [97] and Fawcett [59] have argued that the most likely political 
circumstance to lead to the introduction of TEQs or any form of PCT is the 
convergence of three factors: the failure to meet national greenhouse gas reduction 
targets; political leaders needing new ideas in the face of pressure from the public, 
NGOs or other powerful stakeholders; and a fully developed policy option, ready to 
go. 
 
Whilst the first of these is already unfolding before us, we in the carbon management 
community have a role to play in all three factors if society is to achieve 
decarbonisation. With regard to the first – the failure of current policy – we must 
communicate: we have access to resources and knowledge, and the responsibility to 
use these for the benefit of all. We can speak up, both within academia and more 
widely, about the failure to meet targets.  And we can use our positions to 
demonstrate both that the findings of climatology demand more rigorous targets and 
that radical policies to deliver the required targets are available. 
 
We can also actively contribute to the second factor by helping build pressure on 
governments and creating the political space for radical policy change. Extreme 
weather events continue to contribute to this, from Hurricane Katrina to the 2014 
flooding in the UK [226], but as powerful and well-informed stakeholders we must play 
our part.  For too long our community has sheltered behind the notion that our 
responsibility is simply to publish research and hope that it is picked up.  If we 
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exercised our minds individually and collectively, utilising an understanding of how 
to realise socio-technical transitions, we could devise many effective ways of building 
and using our influence, for example through shared petitions, position papers and 
writing for wider print and social media. In this era where research is increasingly 
assessed on its ‘impact’, many opportunities present themselves. We can also work 
collaboratively with NGOs, activists and progressive companies/think-tanks, 
informing their work as to appropriate policy interventions, and supporting them in 
building the widespread public support for policy change that is required.  
 
Finally, we can further develop the evidence base behind TEQs by contributing to a 
comprehensive research programme informed by political and social realities. This 
could be undertaken in the old 'winner takes all' model, where one large research 
centre successfully bids for funding to carry out the complete programme. However, 
more likely, this programme will be as internationally dispersed and diverse as the 
research carried out into TEQs/PCT to date, with some carried out by established 
centres with grant funding and some driven by the good will and enthusiasm of 
individuals, communities, research centres, businesses and NGOs.  Other papers have 
already sketched out a multidisciplinary research and implementation programme 
[38,45,46,59,90,100]. What matters is that this effort is targeted and collaborative, so that we 
develop a robustly evidenced, ready-to-go policy option that satisfies the needs of 
every stakeholder, from politicians to the public, from industry to the third sector. 
 
While there is broad consensus within the research community that outstanding 
questions remain to be answered before TEQs is implemented, there is much that can 
be done now towards that end.  In the words of the UK House of Commons 
Environmental Audit Committee,  
 
“there is no barrier to the Government developing and deploying the policies that 
will not only prepare the ground for personal carbon trading, but which will 
ensure its effectiveness and acceptance once implemented” [34]. 
 
That implementation represents the point at which calculating appropriate emissions 
pathways would become more than a paper exercise.  In the fight against the 
destabilisation of our climate, society would finally have teeth. 
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For supplementary discussion see: 
http://www.teqs.net/CarbonManagementSupplementary.pdf  
 
 
The supplementary discussion addresses a number of issues that were 
raised during peer review, but are beyond the scope of the main article.  
This acts as an important supplement to the main text, and may serve to 
deepen the reader’s understanding of the features and implications of the 
TEQs system. 
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Key terms 
 
Carbon pricing: Umbrella term referring to policy frameworks – such as carbon 
taxation and conventional carbon trading – which use increases in the price of carbon 
as the core mechanism to restrain emissions.  The term is distinguished from quantity-
based carbon policy frameworks, which are built around a hard cap on emissions.  On 
this definition, TEQs is not an example of 'carbon pricing', since the scheme is built 
around a hard cap, with the price of TEQs units merely providing a highly visible 
indicator of how well society is adapting to the declining cap. 
 
Social cost of carbon: The social cost of carbon measures the marginal cost to society 
of emitting one extra tonne of carbon today, incorporating the full economic cost of 
the climatic damage it will cause over its atmospheric lifetime.  In theory, it signals 
what society should be willing to pay now in order to avoid the future damage caused 
by emissions. 
 
Upstream: Refers to policy that engages with the limited numbers of fuel and energy 
companies that bring carbon into an economy.  Upstream policy has the advantage of 
being cheaper to implement than downstream engagement (defined below). 
 
Common purpose: Shared effort to reach a shared goal, with personal aims and 
collective aims aligned.  Here applied to uniting a nation in the aim of radical 
reductions in energy demand. 
 
Personal Carbon Trading (PCT): Umbrella term for frameworks that include an 
element of trading for individuals, including TEQs and Personal Carbon Allowances 
(PCAs).  PCAs would only cover individuals, and non-specialists can find the term 
PCT misleading when applied to the TEQs scheme, which covers all sectors of the 
economy, but it is the established umbrella term within the field. 
 
Carbon rating: Under the TEQs scheme, each fuel or electricity source is subjected 
to a lifecycle emissions analysis in order to determine its 'carbon rating'.  This rating 
determines the number of TEQs units that must be surrendered alongside a purchase 
of that energy – e.g. 0.1 units per kWh, or 2.1 units per litre.  One TEQs unit permits 
the purchase of an amount of fuel of electricity that produces 1 kg of CO2 over its 
lifecycle (i.e. not only from final combustion, but also the combustion of all other 
energy consumed in bringing it to market).   
 
Downstream: Refers to policy that engages with the many millions of individuals and 
households that consume energy in an economy.  Downstream policy has the 
advantage of engaging directly with the source of energy demand. 
 
Extrinsic motivation: Being motivated by the prospect of an external reward for 
undertaking a task, or penalty for not doing so. 
 
Intrinsic motivation: Being motivated by one's own desire for the direct 
consequences of a task undertaken, or by the inherent value seen in undertaking it. 
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